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The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. announced a 
framework for judicial review of agency actions that are challenged as 
arbitrary and capricious.  The decision, however, left two significant 
questions unresolved:  How much political influence in agency decision-
making is too much to fail judicial review?  And may a reviewing court 
scrutinize the agency’s substantive policy choice or not?  This Note argues 
that Department of Commerce v. New York and Department of Homeland 
Security v. Regents of the University of California—the Court’s most recent 
applications of State Farm—settle these questions. 
This Note argues that Chief Justice Roberts’s answer to the question of 
how much political influence is “too much” under State Farm is that this is 
the wrong question to be asking.  An agency’s “unstated reasons” for 
acting—such as political influences, motivations, presidential agendas, and 
the like—are excluded from the State Farm analysis.  The only question for a 
court reviewing an agency decision pursuant to State Farm is whether the 
agency sufficiently engaged in reasoned decision-making. 
Next, this Note maintains that Chief Justice Roberts’s answer to the 
question of whether judicial review pursuant to State Farm permits scrutiny 
of an agency’s substantive policy decision is a firm no, because it is the 
agency, and not the reviewing court, that must engage in substantive 
decision-making.  The focus of judicial review pursuant to State Farm is not 
the substance of an agency’s decision but the reason-giving process that led 
the agency to its substantive decision. 
Putting these two arguments together, this Note argues that the application 
of State Farm in Department of Commerce and Regents—referred to as Chief 
Justice Roberts’s “hard look review”—makes clear that it is an agency’s 
reasons for acting and its reasoning process that sit at the center of the 
Court’s review under State Farm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Do you get the impression the Supreme Court doesn’t like me?”1  
President Donald Trump tweeted this question shortly after the U.S. Supreme 
Court published its decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Regents 
of the University of California,2 in which it rejected the rescission of the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program by the secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3  The Supreme Court 
split 5-4 in concluding that the secretary’s rescission of DACA was arbitrary 
and capricious, in violation of § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure 
Act4 (APA), because DHS failed to comply “with the procedural requirement 
that it provide a reasoned explanation for its action.”5  Chief Justice Roberts 
penned the majority opinion and subsequently faced several attacks from 
Republican lawmakers:  Representative Jim Jordan of Ohio stated that Chief 
 
 1. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 18, 2020, 11:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1273634152433188865 [https://perma.cc/ 
7SYW-T6JW]. 
 2. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
 3. See id. at 1912; see also Mark Moore, Trump Suggests Supreme Court ‘Doesn’t Like’ 
Him After DACA Ruling, N.Y. POST (June 18, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://nypost.com/ 
2020/06/18/trump-says-supreme-court-doesnt-like-him-after-daca-ruling [https://perma.cc/ 
WU3M-7C8W]. 
 4. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706. 
 5. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916. 
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Justice Roberts was “convoluting the law to appease the DC establishment,” 
and Senator Ted Cruz of Texas criticized the decision as “lawless.”6 
Conservative figures similarly lambasted the Chief Justice for his majority 
opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York,7 accusing him of acting 
like a politician8 and “betray[ing] the US Constitution.”9  In that decision, 
Chief Justice Roberts determined that the secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce’s attempt to reinstate a citizenship question in the 2020 Census 
was not arbitrary or capricious10 but rejected the action as pretextual, holding 
that the reason proffered for the change was contrived.11 
Are these critiques of the Chief Justice warranted?  Can one fairly read 
these two decisions as stretching the law or applying an unlawful standard of 
review?  Answering these questions requires an understanding of the legal 
standard agencies must meet to survive arbitrary and capricious judicial 
review—a standard the Supreme Court has historically left hazy.12 
In both Department of Commerce and Regents, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the arbitrary and capricious challenges pursuant to the framework 
laid out in its 1983 opinion, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.13  Cited in over 700 D.C. Circuit 
opinions, State Farm remains the seminal case on arbitrary and capricious 
review.14  The State Farm Court is considered to have “reaffirmed the 
judiciary’s central role in ensuring regularity with the core administrative 
value of reasoned decision-making”15 by embracing “hard look review” for 
arbitrary and capricious challenges to agency action.16 
State Farm, however, as a split decision, showed how reasonable minds 
can disagree on what constitutes reasoned decision-making,17 and legal 
 
 6. Devan Cole & Jamie Ehrlich, GOP Lawmakers Tear into John Roberts Over DACA 
Ruling, CNN (June 18, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/republican-
criticism-john-roberts-daca-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/TR3N-LZ5J]. 
 7. 139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019). 
 8. See Josh Gerstein, Conservatives Blast Roberts as Turncoat, POLITICO (June 27, 2019, 
8:54 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/27/conservatives-blast-roberts-1386124 
[https://perma.cc/M32Q-A3TY]. 
 9. Sebastian Gorka (@SebGorka), TWITTER (June 27, 2019, 2:28 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SebGorka/status/1144311489941135360 [https://perma.cc/ZRZ3-ERYA]. 
 10. See Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2571. 
 11. See id. at 2575. 
 12. See, e.g., Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 419, 428 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court has “left the doctrine for 
reviewing agency rulemaking in shambles”). 
 13. 463 U.S. 29 (1983); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 
140 S. Ct. 1891, 1912–13 (2020); Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2569. 
 14. See Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an Era of 
Partisan Volatility, 69 EMORY L.J. 1, 34 n.149 (2019). 
 15. Id. at 35. 
 16. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 
U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 772 (2008) (“State Farm was widely taken to have ratified the hard look 
doctrine.”). 
 17. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made 
Reasonable:  Structural and Conceptual Reform of the “Hard Look,” 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
331, 348 (2016). 
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scholars have since debated what State Farm’s hard look review actually 
requires of agencies.18  This Note focuses on two of the debates raised in 
State Farm. 
First, scholars and courts have grappled with determining the permissible 
extent of political influence in agency decision-making, beyond which 
agency action would fail State Farm’s arbitrary and capricious judicial 
review.19  The second highly debated question is whether hard look review 
penalizes an agency for substantive and procedural defects in its decision-
making or whether State Farm requires courts to scrutinize only procedural 
defects.  This Note argues that the recent decisions in Department of 
Commerce and Regents settle these two issues regarding hard look review 
that State Farm left unresolved.  Specifically, Department of Commerce and 
Regents show that political influence is permissible in agency decision-
making—albeit irrelevant to the reviewing court’s analysis under State 
Farm—and that State Farm exclusively scrutinizes an agency’s reason-
giving process but not the substance of its policy decision. 
Part I explains the origins of the reasoned decision-making requirement 
and explores its development in the formative cases of State Farm, 
Department of Commerce, and Regents.  Part II discusses how legal scholars 
have treated, and attempted to make sense of, the two aforementioned issues 
in State Farm.  Having considered the relevant background and leading 
academic commentary, Part III offers an answer to these unresolved 
questions by arguing that Department of Commerce and Regents show:  (1) 
an agency decision will survive arbitrary and capricious review when, even 
if motivated by politics, it was the product of reasoned decision-making; and 
(2) hard look review is a procedural tool used to ensure that agencies 
adequately discuss and justify their actions, rather than a substantive analysis. 
I.  THE GENESIS OF THE REASONED DECISION-MAKING REQUIREMENT 
A long-standing principle of administrative law is that the APA, for 
purposes of regulating agency behavior, requires agencies to engage in 
“reasoned decisionmaking.”20  The phrase “reasoned decisionmaking,” 
however, does not appear in the APA, and the Supreme Court did not use the 
phrase prior to decisions from its 1982 term21—specifically, Baltimore Gas 
& Electric Co. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.22 and State 
 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See Barry Sullivan & Christine Kexel Chabot, The Science of Administrative Change, 
52 CONN. L. REV. 1, 66 (2020) (noting that subsequent Supreme Court decisions applying State 
Farm have failed to resolve the tension between expertise and deference to political influence 
that divided the Justices). 
 20. See, e.g., Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) 
(stating that the APA establishes a scheme of reasoned agency decision-making that courts 
enforce to ensure regulations are “supported by the reasons that the agencies adduce”); John 
F. Duffy, Reasoned Decisionmaking vs. Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 104 IOWA L. 
REV. 2351, 2352 (2019). 
 21. See Duffy, supra note 20, at 2360. 
 22. 462 U.S. 87 (1983). 
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Farm.23  Nonetheless, the idea that an agency must justify its actions existed 
at the Supreme Court prior to the Court’s use of the phrase and in 
administrative law even prior to the APA’s enactment.24 
A.  Judicial Review Pre–State Farm 
Indeed, in a 1947 decision, the Supreme Court held that when “dealing 
with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is 
authorized to make, [the Court] must judge the propriety of such action solely 
by the grounds invoked by the agency.”25  In SEC v. Chenery Corp.26 
(Chenery II), the Court affirmed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
denial of a holding company’s reorganization plan—a decision the Court 
originally rejected a few years prior—on grounds that now the commission 
had thoroughly expressed the reasons for its decision.27  The Court found that 
the agency’s decision was “the product of administrative experience, 
appreciation of the complexities of the problem, realization of the statutory 
policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.”28 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chenery II is couched in the fundamental 
principle of administrative law that, unlike Congress, agencies must 
articulate reasons for their policymaking.29  By focusing judicial review on 
how an agency has justified its action, the Chenery II decision made explicit 
reason-giving a significant part of agency policymaking.30 
Some legal scholars have traced the roots of reasoned decision-making to 
before the 1947 Chenery II decision—specifically, to President Woodrow 
Wilson’s late nineteenth-century vision of the administrative state.31  
President Wilson envisioned an administrative state comprised of a 
“technically schooled civil service”32 with the “best minds,”33 “removed 
 
 23. 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983). 
 24. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 420 (1971) 
(stating that courts must engage in “a thorough, probing, in-depth review” and that “since the 
[administrative] record may not disclose the factors that were considered . . . it may be 
necessary for the District Court to require some explanation . . . to determine . . . if the 
Secretary’s action was justifiable”); Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 
156, 167 (1962) (“There are no findings and no analysis here to justify the choice made, no 
indication of the basis on which the Commission exercised its expert discretion.”). 
 25. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
 26. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 27. See id. at 199. 
 28. Id. at 209. 
 29. See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 
955–56 (2007) (“At its core, the Chenery principle directs judicial scrutiny toward what the 
agency has said on behalf of its action, not simply toward the permissibility or rationality of 
its ultimate decision . . . .”). 
 30. Id. at 957. 
 31. See Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and 
Presidential Preferences, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 501–02 (2019); Kathryn A. Watts, 
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 33 & 
n.138 (2009). 
 32. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 216 (1887). 
 33. Id. at 221. 
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from the hurry and strife of politics.”34  His view of agencies as apolitical, 
expert institutions that could best address societal problems justified the 
explosive growth of the administrative state during the New Deal.35  Then 
contemporary luminaries believed that agency expertise alone warranted 
Congress’s broad delegations of power to agencies.36 
Other scholars have argued that reasoned decision-making is not a legacy 
of President Wilson’s expertise model but is better traced to the interest group 
model of the administrative state, which became an accepted justification for 
agency rulemaking by the early 1970s.37  The interest group model emerged 
following the New Deal, due to increasing skepticism that expertise was not 
all that guided agency decision-making.38  That agencies made value 
judgments in the course of exercising their broad directives from Congress 
grew apparent as groups that regularly sustained the costs of an agency’s 
rulemakings organized to have their interests represented.39  Rather than 
being apolitical experts, agencies were increasingly seen as entities prone to 
“capture” by the industries they regulated, raising concerns of political 
accountability to those outside the regulated industry who were inevitably 
affected by agency actions.40  Courts responded to the threat of capture by 
creating a more aggressive standard of judicial review of agency action—one 
that “force[d] agencies to engage in technocratic decisionmaking open to 
participation by varying interest groups”—by imposing a burden of 
explanation on the agency when it adopted or amended a rule.41 
Although § 706(2)(A) of the APA already instructed federal courts to 
invalidate agency decisions that were “arbitrary” or “capricious,”42 various 
judges on the D.C. Circuit in the 1960s and 1970s ramped up this judicial 
review to require that an agency survive a “hard look.”43  The hard look 
doctrine requires agencies to offer “encyclopedic[] explanations for their 
conclusions, to respond to counterarguments, to justify departures from past 
practices, and to give careful consideration to alternatives to the proposed 
 
 34. Id. at 209. 
 35. Roesler, supra note 31, at 502. 
 36. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 9; see also Watts, supra note 31, at 33–34 
(stating that through the New Deal, “agencies derived their legitimacy from the notion that 
they were made up of professional and capable government ‘experts’ pursuing the ‘public 
interest’”). 
 37. Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 148–49, 153 (2012). 
 38. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761 (2007). 
 39. See Roesler, supra note 31, at 502; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 154 
(“Agency staff members often share the professional background of the employees of the 
companies they regulate and . . . interact closely with their industry compatriots on a day-to-
day basis.”). 
 40. See Roesler, supra note 31, at 502–03, 502 n.49. 
 41. Watts, supra note 31, at 34; see also Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 155 (“The doctrinal 
details of the reasoned decision-making standard respond to the cautionary message of the 
interest group model.”). 
 42. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 43. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 761. 
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course of action.”44  The reasoned decision-making requirement of hard look 
review was intended to serve as a source of legitimacy for an agency’s action 
and to ensure that the agency was a responsible agent of Congress, faithfully 
exercising its granted discretion.45  In State Farm, the Supreme Court signed 
on to the idea that arbitrary and capricious review requires courts to take a 
“hard look” at agency action.46 
B.  State Farm’s Hard Look Review 
Seen as the moment when the Court endorsed the reasoned decision-
making requirement,47 the State Farm decision has since been criticized as 
providing limited guidance to lower courts on how to apply what has become 
a controversial standard of review.48  At issue in State Farm was whether the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) rescission of 
Modified Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious.49  
This rule required manufacturers to equip vehicles produced after September 
1982 with airbags or automatic seat belts.50 
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 196651 to 
“reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from 
traffic accidents.”52  The Act directed the secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Transportation to issue—after considering “relevant available motor 
vehicle safety data”—vehicle safety standards that were “reasonable, 
practicable and appropriate” and “me[t] the need for motor vehicle safety.”53 
As initially promulgated in 1967, Safety Standard 208 required the 
installation of seat belts in all passenger cars.54  Employing these seat belts, 
also known as “active belt systems,” required passengers to manually secure 
the lap and shoulder belts.55  NHTSA later found that although “highly 
effective” when worn, the “low usage rate of active seat belt systems 
negate[d] much of their potential safety benefit.”56  Thus, in July 1969, the 
agency invited public comment on a revised safety standard mandating 
passive-restraint systems in passenger cars.57  Unlike active belt systems—
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 31 & n.207. 
 46. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 771–72. 
 47. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 154. 
 48. Keller, supra note 12, at 438. 
 49. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 38 (1983). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 1379. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. § 103(a), (f)(3), 80 Stat. 718 at 719. 
 54. See Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (Feb. 3, 
1967) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
 55. See Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg. 34,289, 34,290 (July 5, 1977) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 56. Id. at 34,289–90. 
 57. See Inflatable Occupant Restraint Systems, 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148, 11,148 (proposed 
July 2, 1969). 
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which depend on manual buckling to provide safety—passive restraints 
deliver crash protection without requiring passengers to take any action 
because they deploy automatically upon entry or collision.58 
In 1977, after repeated revisions to Safety Standard 20859 and a subsequent 
suspension of the regulation due to widespread public opposition,60 President 
Jimmy Carter’s secretary of transportation issued Modified Standard 208, a 
new “automatic passive restraints” regulation that obliged auto 
manufacturers to equip passenger cars with either airbags or passive seat 
belts.61  NHTSA estimated that these precautions would prevent over 9000 
deaths and 65,000 injuries annually.62 
In April 1981, however, President Ronald Reagan’s secretary of 
transportation proposed a rescission of Modified Standard 208 due to the 
“economic difficulties of the automobile industry.”63  In October 1981, 
NHTSA promulgated a final rule rescinding the requirement that auto 
manufacturers install either airbags or passive seat belts.64  The agency 
explained that it could no longer determine whether the passive restraint 
requirements would provide more than “minimal safety benefits,”65 and thus, 
imposing the substantial costs of the requirements on the public would be 
unreasonable.66  It was this decision to rescind that insurance companies 
challenged for being arbitrary and capricious.67 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded in State Farm that NHTSA’s 
rescission of the passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious 
because NHTSA’s explanation failed to convince the Court that the 
 
 58. See id. 
 59. See, e.g., Occupant Crash Protection, 37 Fed. Reg. 3911, 3911 (Feb. 24, 1972) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) (noting that the passive-restraint requirement would be effective 
in August 1975); Occupant Crash Protection in Passenger Cars, Multipurpose Passenger 
Vehicles, Trucks, and Buses, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,927, 16,927 (Nov. 3, 1970) (to be codified at 49 
C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 60. See Ernest Holsendolph, Coleman Puts off Air‐Bag Ruling; Proposes a Limited 
Voluntary Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/12/07/ 
archives/coleman-puts-off-airbag-ruling-proposes-a-limited-voluntary-plan.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z9SH-52EN] (stating that President Gerald Ford’s secretary of 
transportation was concerned the passive restraints “would be badly received by the driving 
public”). 
 61. Occupant Restraint Systems, 42 Fed. Reg. at 34,289–90. 
 62. See id. at 34,298. 
 63. Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 21,205, 21,206 (Apr. 9, 1981) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 64. See Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 53,419, 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 65. Id. at 53,424.  If Modified Standard 208 were to go into effect, NHTSA stated that 
“the assumed life-saving potential of air bags would not have been realized” because 
manufacturers “planned to install them in less than 1 percent of new cars,” and “the 
overwhelming majority of new cars would be equipped with automatic belts that are 
detachable,” which “might only approach [usage] levels similar to those currently achieved 
with manual belts.” Id. at 53,421–22. 
 66. Id. at 53,420, 53,423 (“Vehicle price increases would have amounted to approximately 
$1 billion per year.”). 
 67. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29, 39 (1983). 
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rescission “was the product of reasoned decisionmaking.”68  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court framed arbitrary and capricious review in “expert-
driven terms”69:  an agency’s decision would be arbitrary if the agency 
“relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation 
for its decision that runs counter to the evidence . . . or is so implausible that 
it could not be . . . the product of agency expertise.”70 
The Court stated further that the “scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency” but requires the agency to “examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”71  Notably, the 
Court, referencing Chenery II, reiterated that if a reviewing court identifies 
deficiencies in an agency’s explanation, it “may not supply a reasoned basis 
for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not given.”72 
When applying this standard to NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard 
208, all nine Justices agreed that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
because it failed to consider whether to modify the regulation to impose an 
airbags-only requirement.73  Given NHTSA’s earlier determination that 
“airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial lifesaving technology,” the 
Court referred to an airbags-only requirement as “the logical response.”74  
The Justices split 5-4, however, on whether—in light of auto manufacturers’ 
plans to largely install detachable automatic belts75—NHTSA’s decision to 
rescind the safety standard as to the passive seat belts was also arbitrary and 
capricious.76 
Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, recognized that “[e]xpert 
discretion is the lifeblood of the administrative process” and determined that 
the agency failed to “bring its expertise to bear on the question.”77  The 
majority found no evidence to support NHTSA’s conclusion that detachable 
automatic belts would yield usage levels similar to those currently achieved 
with manual belts78 and provided that NHTSA “failed to articulate a basis for 
not requiring nondetachable belts.”79 
Conversely, Justice William Rehnquist, in dissent, determined that 
NHTSA’s “explanation, while by no means a model, [was] adequate” 
because it articulated a rational basis for its conclusion—namely that the 
 
 68. Id. at 52. 
 69. Watts, supra note 31, at 7. 
 70. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 71. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
 72. Id. (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)). 
 73. Id. at 46. 
 74. Id. at 48, 51. 
 75. See supra note 65. 
 76. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57–58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 77. Id. at 48, 54 (majority opinion). 
 78. Id. at 52–53. 
 79. Id. at 55. 
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small increase in seat belt usage would not be worth the cost of requiring 
detachable automatic belts.80  Moreover, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged 
that NHTSA’s decision to rescind Modified Standard 208 “seem[ed] to be 
related to the election of a new President of a different political party” but 
nonetheless argued that, “[a]s long as the agency remains within the bounds 
established by Congress,” a “change in administration . . . is a perfectly 
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of” its regulations.81 
State Farm’s split decision became the seminal case on arbitrary and 
capricious review.82  Apart from establishing the standard of review for 
future § 706(2)(A) challenges, State Farm also foreshadowed how the 
Supreme Court would resolve these actions—in lengthy opinions featuring 
some disputing Justices.  The next section discusses two recent Supreme 
Court cases applying State Farm, both of which echo the 1983 decision and 
notably display even more contentiousness among the Justices. 
C.  State Farm in Recent Supreme Court Cases 
1.  Department of Commerce v. New York 
In March 2018, President Trump’s secretary of commerce, Wilbur Ross, 
announced his decision to reinstate a citizenship question on the 2020 
Census.83  This decision was an exercise of the authority delegated by 
Congress to the secretary to “take a decennial census . . . in such form and 
content as he may determine.”84 
Secretary Ross stated that changing the census to include a citizenship 
question would provide improved citizen voting-age population data, which 
would then be used by the U.S. Department of Justice to better enforce the 
Voting Rights Act of 196585 (VRA) and its ban on minority vote dilution.86  
Secretary Ross explained in a memorandum that, in his judgment, reinstating 
a citizenship question on the Census, while also enhancing the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s administrative records, would provide the most accurate citizen 
voting-age population data in comparison to other available alternatives.87 
 
 80. Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra notes 
65–66 and accompanying text. 
 81. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59. 
 82. See Livermore & Richardson, supra note 14, at 34 n.149. 
 83. Memorandum from Wilbur Ross, Sec’y of Com., to Karen Dunn Kelley, Under Sec’y 
for Econ. Affs., on Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial Census 
Questionnaire (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2018-03-
26_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6XY-84WZ]. 
 84. 13 U.S.C. § 141(a). 
 85. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.). 
 86. See Ross, supra note 83, at 2. 
 87. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that posing the citizenship question to the entire population 
provides each respondent an opportunity to answer and may eliminate the need for the Census 
Bureau to have to impute an answer for millions of people). 
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Secretary Ross said that he considered the argument that reinstatement of 
the citizenship question would depress the response rate.88  But, because the 
Census Bureau failed to present definitive evidence showing how 
responsiveness would be impacted, Secretary Ross ultimately determined 
that more complete and accurate data from surveying the entire population 
outweighed the responsiveness concern.89  Secretary Ross’s decision was 
challenged in federal district court on grounds that, inter alia, the decision 
violated the APA.90 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, held that Secretary Ross’s 
decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious because he appropriately 
examined the Census Bureau’s alternatives for collecting improved data, 
weighed the risks and benefits of each, and explained why reinstating the 
citizenship question presented the best course.91  Because the Secretary—not 
the Census Bureau— is authorized by statute to choose “between reasonable 
policy alternatives in the face of uncertainty” and because the secretary’s 
decision was “reasonably explained,” the Court concluded that the 
reinstatement decision was not arbitrary or capricious.92 
The majority opinion strongly critiqued Justice Breyer’s dissent,93 which 
argued that the secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously because he failed 
to defer to the Census Bureau’s expertise.94  The majority rejected Justice 
Breyer’s acclaim of agency expertise by stating that “policymaking is not a 
‘rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations’” and 
that a court may not set aside an agency’s policy solely because it might have 
been prompted by a president’s agenda.95  By second-guessing the 
secretary’s reasonable exercise of discretion and requiring the secretary to 
defer to the Census Bureau’s position, Chief Justice Roberts maintained that 
Justice Breyer was substituting his judgment for that of the agency—a long-
standing violation of State Farm.96 
Although Secretary Ross’s decision survived arbitrary and capricious 
review, the Court set it aside because the sole reason proffered for reinstating 
the citizenship question—to better enforce the VRA—seemed “contrived.”97  
Chief Justice Roberts based this conclusion on the fact that the record failed 
to show the secretary considered VRA enforcement when deciding to 
 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2019). 
 91. Id. at 2570. 
 92. Id. at 2570–71. 
 93. Id. at 2571. 
 94. Id. at 2590, 2593 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. Id. at 2573 (majority opinion) (quoting Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)). 
 96. Id. at 2571 (“It is not for us to ask whether his decision was ‘the best one possible’ or 
even whether it was ‘better than the alternatives.’” (quoting F.E.R.C. v. Elec. Power Supply 
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016))). 
 97. Id. at 2575 (stating that the secretary’s decision was “unlike a typical case in which an 
agency may have both stated and unstated reasons for a decision”). 
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reinstate the citizenship question, although he began this project early in his 
tenure.98 
In rejecting the secretary’s decision, the Chief Justice established that a 
“court may not reject an agency’s stated reasons for acting simply because 
the agency might also have had other unstated reasons.”99  But where, as 
here, the explanation for the secretary’s decision is “incongruent with what 
the record reveals,” Chief Justice Roberts maintained that Secretary Ross 
violated the reasoned decision-making requirement and that the decision 
could not stand on such a disingenuous rationale.100 
Commentators considered Department of Commerce to be a surprising 
result for reasons ranging from the Court’s use of pretext to its decision to 
leave undetermined whether a citizenship question would appear on the 2020 
Census.101  However, this would not be the last time the Court “decided an 
important case without deciding the questions that make it so important.”102  
The Court’s opinion in Regents, decided one year later and discussed in the 
next section, was especially similar to Department of Commerce in this 
respect.103 
2.  Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California 
On June 15, 2012, President Barack Obama’s secretary of DHS announced 
DACA, an immigration relief program.104  DACA allows undocumented 
persons who entered the United States as children and have continuously 
resided here since 2007 to apply for a two-year forbearance of removal, 
subject to renewal.105  DACA also made its recipients eligible for work 
authorization and other federal benefits, including Social Security and 
Medicare, during the period of deferred action.106 
On September 4, 2017, President Trump’s attorney general, Jeff Sessions, 
sent a letter to Acting DHS Secretary Elaine Duke, advising her to rescind 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2573. 
 100. Id. at 2575–76. 
 101. See Nicholas Bronni, Census Symposium:  Unusual Facts Make for Unusual 
Decisions, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2019/06/census-symposium-unusual-facts-make-for-unusual-decisions [https://perma.cc/ 
K4PC-VG76]. 
 102. Nicholas Bronni, Symposium:  DACA Déjà Vu, SCOTUSBLOG (June 19, 2020, 3:17 
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium-daca-deja-vu [https://perma.cc/ 
ZTM4-DUAF]. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., for David V. 
Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. 
Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-
prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7UGS-8ZCK]. 
 105. Id. at 2–3. 
 106. Id. at 3; see also 42 C.F.R. § 417.422(h) (2020); 8 C.F.R. § 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2021). 
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DACA.107  Attorney General Sessions warned that the DACA program 
shared the “same legal and constitutional defects” the Fifth Circuit and 
Supreme Court had recognized in the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program and thus, was 
likely unlawful.108  Among other defects, the Fifth Circuit found that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act109 foreclosed DAPA’s conferment of 
eligibility for federal and state benefits.110  Secretary Duke rescinded the 
DACA memorandum the following day, citing the attorney general’s letter 
and the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit rulings as the bases for her 
decision.111  Multiple plaintiffs challenged the rescission as arbitrary and 
capricious, in violation of § 706(2)(A).112 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing again for the majority, set aside DACA’s 
rescission after finding that it violated State Farm.113  Notably, the Chief 
Justice reaffirmed that arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm 
requires the Court to be unconcerned with the wisdom of DACA or its 
rescission.114  Rather, the Court is to address only whether the secretary 
“complied with the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned 
explanation for its action.”115 
Chief Justice Roberts held that Secretary Duke’s justification for DACA’s 
rescission involved the same error as NHTSA’s rescission of Modified 
Standard 208 in State Farm, which required consideration of an airbags-only 
requirement.116  State Farm established that for an agency’s rescission of its 
prior policy to survive arbitrary and capricious review, the agency’s reasoned 
analysis must consider the “‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the 
existing [policy].’”117  Chief Justice Roberts stated that, with respect to 
DACA, retaining the program’s forbearance benefit was not just “within the 
ambit of the existing [policy]” but was its “centerpiece.”118  Consequently, 
the secretary’s rescission of DACA required a reasoned explanation as to 
 
 107. See Letter from Jefferson B. Sessions III, Att’y Gen., to Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/ 
994651/download [https://perma.cc/574A-S93Q]. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 and 22 U.S.C.). 
 110. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 111. Memorandum from Elaine C. Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to 
James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. et al. (Sept. 5, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca [https://perma.cc/ 
XT7P-475C]. 
 112. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1903 
(2020). 
 113. Id. at 1912. 
 114. Id. at 1916. 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 1912. 
 117. Id. at 1913 (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., 
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983)). 
 118. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983)). 
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why retaining the forbearance component of the policy, while eliminating 
benefits eligibility—an option within the secretary’s discretion—was 
inappropriate.119  Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Secretary Duke’s 
failure to consider whether to retain DACA’s forbearance component and to 
provide an explanation for its termination constituted arbitrary and capricious 
agency action.120 
In dissent, Justice Thomas criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s reliance on 
State Farm, arguing that the ruling was inapplicable because, in his view, 
DACA is an unlawful policy and has been since its inception.121  Because 
State Farm only establishes what an agency must do to rescind a lawful 
policy, Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacked authority to even 
scrutinize DHS’s reasons for rescinding DACA, noting that the rescission of 
an unlawful program is plainly reasonable.122 
Regents, decided nearly forty years after State Farm, and a similarly split 
decision, shows how the Supreme Court continues to divide over what the 
standard of review for § 706(2)(A) challenges actually entails.  State Farm 
raised many questions that subsequent decisions have left unanswered, two 
of which this Note discusses in the next part.123 
II.  WHAT STATE FARM LEFT UNRESOLVED 
First, tension remains between Justice White’s emphasis on reasoned 
decision-making and Justice Rehnquist’s deference to a new president’s 
political agenda.124  Although hard look review always requires that reasoned 
decision-making and expertise guide an agency’s actions, the Justices 
continue to disagree on how much political influence is too much.125  Second, 
the Supreme Court in State Farm did not clarify whether the agency’s action 
was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to explain its decision not to 
adopt the “the logical response,” or because it failed to adopt “the logical 
 
 119. Id. at 1912. 
 120. Id. at 1913.  The Chief Justice also found DACA’s rescission violated State Farm 
because the secretary failed to consider and adequately explain the reliance interests of the 
program’s beneficiaries weighed against competing policy concerns. Id. at 1914. 
 121. Id. at 1919 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 122. Id. at 1919, 1930. 
 123. See Sullivan & Chabot, supra note 19, at 9. 
 124. Id.; see also Note, Judicial Review of Informal Administrative Rulemaking, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 347, 375 (“Should the courts defer to agency decisions ‘encouraged’ by changes in 
administration?  The dissenters in State Farm would be more likely to accept such politically 
motivated decisions.”). 
 125. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523 (2009) (disagreeing 
with Justice Breyer’s position that courts should be more vigilant of political influences when 
reviewing policy decisions from independent agencies); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2010) (“In 
general, courts have not offered clear guidance on whether political reasons, if offered, can 
serve as an adequate basis for an agency’s decision.”); see also The Supreme Court, 2018 
Term–Leading Cases, 133 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2019) (“[A]gencies cannot take actions 
that are excessively politically driven, and it can be difficult for courts to figure out which 
types of political judgments are acceptable and which are arbitrary and capricious.”). 
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response.”126  Accordingly, ambiguity remains as to whether courts applying 
hard look review should vacate an agency’s action for its procedural defects 
only or for its substantive ones as well.127 
A.  Balancing Political Influence and Expertise 
Following Department of Commerce, some have characterized Chief 
Justice Roberts’s and Justice Breyer’s positions as evidencing a tension 
between political influence and expertise that is reminiscent of Justice 
Rehnquist’s and Justice White’s opinions in State Farm.128  Understanding 
this analogy requires a review of how commentators have interpreted the 
Rehnquist-White debate to determine the proper balance between political 
influence and expertise permitted by State Farm. 
Commentators widely read State Farm—specifically the debate between 
Justices White and Rehnquist—as the Supreme Court’s condemnation of 
political considerations in agency decision-making.129  To support this 
reading of State Farm, these commentators rely on the fact that only Justice 
Rehnquist’s partial dissent conveyed the position that political influences can 
reasonably motivate an agency’s rulemaking (assuming, of course, that the 
agency also respects the statutory boundaries set by Congress), whereas the 
majority opinion stood for the requirement that agencies justify their 
decisions in technocratic, expert-driven terms.130 
Others, however, criticize this reading of State Farm as an exaggerated 
interpretation of Justice White’s opinion, noting that the majority neither 
addressed Justice Rehnquist’s endorsement of political influence as a 
legitimate basis for reappraising agency policy, nor considered the political 
context of NHTSA’s decision beyond mentioning that changes in 
administration had occurred.131  These commentators posit that Justice 
White’s silence should not be taken as a rejection of political influence; that 
 
 126. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48 (“[T]he logical response to the faults of detachable 
seatbelts would be to require the installation of airbags.  At the very least this alternative way 
of achieving the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons given 
for its abandonment.”). 
 127. Compare Miles & Sunstein, supra note 16, at 771 (“[T]he Court endorsed both 
procedural and substantive aspects of the hard look doctrine.”), with Watts, supra note 31, at 
16 (stating that courts “scrutinize the substantive elements of agency decisions” when 
applying hard look review). 
 128. See Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 36–37 (explaining how Chief Justice Roberts evidenced a “desire to reaffirm the 
importance of judicial deference to the policy choices of agencies’ political leadership,” 
whereas Justice Breyer “tied deference for discretionary agency decisions closely to 
expertise”). 
 129. See Watts, supra note 31, at 19 (“[T]he opinion has been widely read over time to 
represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics.”). 
 130. Id. at 6 (“Ever since the Court handed down State Farm, agencies, courts, and scholars 
alike generally seem to have accepted the view that influences coming from one political 
branch or another cannot be allowed to explain administrative decisionmaking, even if such 
factors are influencing agency decisionmaking.”). 
 131. See Mendelson, supra note 125, at 1138. 
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silence is better explained by the fact that NHTSA did not justify the rule’s 
rescission by referencing the change in administration.132 
Legal scholars who conclude that State Farm does not prohibit politics 
from influencing an agency’s decision-making debate the precise role of 
politics envisioned by the 1983 Supreme Court.  Nina Mendelson,133 Kathryn 
Watts,134 and now Justice Kagan135 advocate for greater transparency 
regarding political influence in an agency’s rulemaking.  Watts, for example, 
argues had NHTSA openly disclosed that President Reagan’s deregulatory 
position influenced its decision to rescind the passive seat belt requirement, 
the agency should have satisfied the Court with an adequate explanation 
sufficient to survive arbitrary and capricious review.136  Similarly, Justice 
Kagan praised Justice Rehnquist for recognizing the role that President 
Reagan’s election played in NHTSA’s decision-making and for easing the 
demand for expertise in NHTSA’s justification accordingly.137  Justice 
Kagan argued that although the change in administration could not relieve 
NHTSA of considering obvious regulatory alternatives, it was sufficient to 
justify NHTSA’s value judgment between reasonable policy choices.138 
In response, Mark Seidenfeld argues that other legal scholars’ calls for 
greater transparency about political influence rest on a misguided reading of 
State Farm.139  Seidenfeld maintains that hard look review does not prohibit 
an agency from engaging in “politically motivated” rulemaking but rather 
prevents an agency from using political considerations to justify its 
actions.140  Whether politics have influenced an agency’s decision is 
irrelevant to the reviewing court’s inquiry under State Farm because, 
irrespective of political influence, an agency cannot survive arbitrary and 
capricious judicial review141 if it fails to justify its decision pursuant to the 
 
 132. Id. at 1138–39; Watts, supra note 31, at 19. 
 133. See Mendelson, supra note 125, at 1130 (proposing that agencies be required to 
disclose executive influence on their decisions to increase accountability and deter overreach). 
 134. See Watts, supra note 31, at 8 (arguing that courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious 
review should consider political influences that are disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking record 
as legitimate justifications for the agency’s action). 
 135. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2381–82 
(2001) (arguing that when presidential policy justifies an agency’s action, it should be publicly 
disclosed “to receive judicial credit”). 
 136. Watts, supra note 31, at 72, 77 (proposing that the State Farm opinion could be read 
as “penalizing” NHTSA because the rescission seems to be based on “secret political 
influences”). 
 137. See Kagan, supra note 135, at 2380–81 (suggesting a revised approach to hard look 
review that would relax a reviewing court’s scrutiny “when demonstrable evidence shows that 
the President has taken an active role in” the decision). 
 138. Id. at 2381. 
 139. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 144–45 (“Watts and her fellow critics of hard-look 
review are correct that courts have not credited citations to political influence in evaluating 
whether agency rulemaking meets the hard-look standard.  But, . . . this does not reflect any 
hostility within the standard to such influence.”). 
 140. Id. at 150 (“A policy that is motivated by the president’s desire to provide benefits to 
his political supporters may nonetheless be defensible as good policy.”). 
 141. Id. at 163–64 (providing the example that, had NHTSA rescinded Modified Standard 
208 to protect the autonomy of car owners to buy the cars that they prefer, the Supreme Court 
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factors Congress authorized it to consider when making policy.142  
Seidenfeld argues that because the judiciary is least accountable to the polity, 
a reviewing court has “no business”143 penalizing an agency for an “unstated 
rationale” in its decision-making if the stated justification is within 
Congress’s permissible bounds—provided that the agency’s proffered 
explanation is not so implausible that it is pretextual.144  This position, 
Seidenfeld asserts, is consistent with State Farm’s hard look review because 
it ensures transparency in agency decision-making by evaluating its stated 
justifications but allows an agency to make value judgments that Congress 
authorized it to make without judicial constraint, by keeping an agency’s 
unstated reasons out of the court’s review.145 
Following the Chief Justice’s opinion in Department of Commerce, more 
commentators have framed the unresolved tension between expertise and 
political influence in State Farm as an issue of how a reviewing court should 
consider an agency’s unstated reasons for its policy.  Jennifer Nou, for 
example, argues that although the majority in Department of Commerce set 
aside the secretary’s decision on pretextual grounds, administrative law has 
always tolerated some pretext.146  To support this argument, Nou relies on 
Chief Justice Roberts’s assertions in Department of Commerce that agency 
decisions may appropriately rest on both “stated and unstated reasons” and 
that a court may not set aside an agency action only because unstated political 
considerations influenced the agency’s decision-making process.147  The 
“new principle” introduced in Department of Commerce, Nou argues, is that 
arbitrary and capricious review under State Farm rejects “wholly implausible 
rationale[s]”—in other words, an agency’s explanation must at least be 
supported in the administrative record to avoid being set aside as 
pretextual.148 
In contrast, some commentators have bolstered Justice Thomas’s 
argument in dissent regarding the unprecedented nature of the Court’s 
 
likely would have held the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because car owner 
autonomy is not a factor that NHTSA’s authorizing statute allowed it to consider). 
 142. In State Farm, the factors the Court looked for in NHTSA’s explanation of its decision 
included, inter alia, whether NHTSA established, based on “relevant available motor vehicle 
safety data,” that Modified Standard 208 was no longer “reasonable, practicable and 
appropriate” and would not “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 436 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1983) (quoting 
National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 103(f)(1), (3)–(4), 80 
Stat. 718, 719, repealed by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 745, 
1379). 
 143. Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 159. 
 144. See id. at 162. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Jennifer Nou, Census Symposium:  A Place for Pretext in Administrative Law?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 12:54 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/census-
symposium-a-place-for-pretext-in-administrative-law [https://perma.cc/RTU8-WBPR]; see 
also Watts, supra note 31, at 40 (arguing that agencies undergoing arbitrariness review “dress 
up their decisions . . . to hide political influences”). 
 147. Nou, supra note 146. 
 148. Id. 
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invalidation on pretext grounds.149  Louis Murray, for example, criticizes the 
Court for reading a prohibition on pretext into § 706 of the APA.150  Murray 
argues that because the APA lacks a “sincerity requirement,” an agency 
should survive arbitrary and capricious review as long as it offers a 
reasonable justification and even if it masks the true motivation behind its 
action.151  Samuel Estreicher also rejects Chief Justice Roberts’s invalidation 
on pretext grounds because he argues that it disqualifies Secretary Ross—
who is deemed the decision maker by Congress on this issue—from making 
an otherwise legally justified decision.152 
Gillian Metzger defends Chief Justice Roberts’s pretext analysis on the 
ground that, although courts do not usually speak in terms of pretext, State 
Farm made a prohibition on pretextual decision-making a part of arbitrary 
and capricious review.153  Metzger explains that the Supreme Court rejected 
NHTSA’s justification for rescinding Modified Standard 208—that the 
measure would not achieve its predicted safety benefits—because NHTSA 
did not adequately consider obvious alternatives that would promote 
safety.154  In doing so, the Supreme Court implied that safety was not actually 
motivating NHTSA’s decision-making.155  Thus, State Farm rejects 
pretextual justifications without labeling them as such.156  An advantage of 
including pretext as part of arbitrary and capricious review, Metzger argues, 
is that it allows courts to avoid delineating what extent of political influence 
is legitimate in agency decision-making.157 
Evidently, the White-Rehnquist debate between reasoned decision-making 
and deference to a president’s political agenda continues; the question of how 
a reviewing court should consider political influence on agency decision-
making when engaging in State Farm’s hard look review remains 
unresolved.  The next section discusses another ambiguity in State Farm:  
whether courts applying hard look review should vacate an agency’s action 
for its procedural defects only or for its substantive ones as well. 
B.  The Logical Response:  A Failure to Discuss or a Failure to Adopt? 
Whether State Farm penalizes an agency for failing to discuss other 
regulatory alternatives or failing to adopt those alternatives is rooted in the 
 
 149. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2576, 2579 (2019) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that under settled principles of 
administrative law, a reviewing court is never to inquire into pretext). 
 150. See Louis Murray, Note, Reconceptualizing Pretext’s Role in Administrative Law, 57 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 481, 487–88 (2020). 
 151. Id. at 483, 493. 
 152. See Samuel Estreicher, “Pretext” and Review of Executive Decisionmaking in the 
Citizenship Census Question Case, JUSTIA (July 9, 2019), https://verdict.justia.com/2019/07/ 
09/pretext-and-review-of-executive-decisionmaking-in-the-citizenship-census-question-case 
[https://perma.cc/RA4X-XM82]. 
 153. See Metzger, supra note 128, at 33–34. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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broader question of whether a reviewing court is to scrutinize the agency’s 
decision-making process only or the substance of its ultimate decision as 
well. 
Commentators have argued that State Farm’s hard look review solely 
scrutinizes an agency’s reasoning process, noting that the Court there 
rejected NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard 208 because the agency 
failed to consider alternatives and thus engaged in a flawed decision-making 
process.158  Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule approach this issue with 
evidence that, between 1983 and 2016, the Court reached the merits on sixty-
four arbitrariness challenges but held an agency’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious only 13 percent of the time.159  In showing that surviving hard 
look review is “hardly a heroic task,” Gersen and Vermeule imply that the 
Court does not use State Farm to set aside an agency’s decision “simply 
because the court is unhappy with the result reached”—i.e., for failing to 
adopt an alternative policy.160 
Others are not so certain that process is all that is in play.161  Now Attorney 
General Merrick Garland, who served as counsel for State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Company in State Farm, argues that the decision presents a “quasi-
procedural” standard for judicial review.162  The standard is “quasi-
procedural” because it imposes substantive requirements for the agency’s 
decision-making record but leaves the method for producing the record up to 
the agency.163  Garland finds support for this position in Justice White’s 
majority opinion, in which the Court stated that an agency must supply a 
reasoned analysis to justify its decision.164  The Court found NHTSA failed 
to do so because it rescinded the entire passive-restraint rule without 
explaining its reasons for rejecting, or even considering, an airbags-only 
requirement—“the logical response.”165 
Garland also argues that although Justice White’s opinion is couched in 
“quasi-procedural rhetoric,” to read State Farm as identifying no substantive 
component to hard look review is incorrect.166  The Court’s substantive 
review is evidenced by its charge that the agency failed to explain why it did 
not impose a nondetachable seat belt requirement, when, as Garland argues, 
 
 158. Patrick Garry, The Values and Viewpoints Affecting Judicial Review of Agency 
Actions:  A Focus on the Hard-Look Doctrine, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 71, 73 (2014); see also 
Seidenfeld, supra note 37, at 155 (arguing that State Farm’s hard look review “is essentially 
process based” because outcomes need not “meet any particular substantive standard” but 
must only be justified by “addressing factors . . . relevant to its decision”). 
 159. Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 
1362 (2016) (noting that it would have been “only 8 percent of the time if we confine ourselves 
to pure arbitrariness cases”). 
 160. Id. at 1360, 1362. 
 161. See Keller, supra note 12, at 452 (arguing that “State Farm opened the door for courts 
to scrutinize the substantive policy decisions made by agencies”). 
 162. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 507, 
543 (1985). 
 163. Id. at 530. 
 164. Id. at 543. 
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Justice Rehnquist’s dissent showed that NHTSA proffered a detailed 
explanation on this issue.167  Because NHTSA “could have ‘considered’ and 
‘explained’ until it was hoarse, yet still not have changed the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion,” Garland maintains that the Court penalized NHTSA both for 
failing to consider (process) and for failing to adopt (substance), the logical 
response.168 
Another way of analyzing the difference between process and substance 
with respect to State Farm’s hard look review is to consider whether the 
agency, on remand, can revise the defect that led the reviewing court to deem 
the action arbitrary and capricious.  Garland argues that if the defect is a 
failure to consider or adequately explain a regulatory alternative, then it is 
procedural, and the agency may improve its decision-making process on 
remand by better explaining itself.169  Once corrected, the agency may adopt 
the same policy as originally planned, and a court must uphold it.170  If, 
however, the defect is a failure to adopt a specific policy, then the issue is 
substantive, and a court will preclude the agency from readopting the same 
policy on remand.171  Thus, the only solution available to an agency on 
remand for a substantive defect is to adopt a different policy.172 
This question between process and substance seemed to be top of mind 
during oral argument in Regents.  Justice Kavanaugh, for example, asked 
whether DACA’s rescission would “still fall short” if “it were detailed more 
fully” on remand.173  Justice Gorsuch proposed that if the secretary’s error is 
a failure to adequately explain the rescission, “What more is left to be 
said?”174  Similarly, Justice Breyer asked whether there was any purpose to 
remanding when the secretary would “come out the same way,” noting that 
prior Justices have urged courts to refrain from “playing ping pong with the 
agency” if there is nothing to gain on remand.175 
Some have described Chief Justice Roberts’s decision to remand to DHS 
for further explanation as being one of process, noting that the Court took 
issue with the secretary’s decision-making process but not the outcome.176  
 
 167. See id. at 546 (“By any measure, the agency’s explanation was not only detailed, but 
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 168. Id. at 548–49. 
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 175. Id. at 82. 
 176. See Peter Margulies, The DACA Case:  Agencies’ “Square Corners” and Reliance 
Interests in Immigration Law, 2019–2020 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 128 (arguing that Chief 
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Others criticize the majority for simply delaying the final resolution of 
DACA, as its opinion tells DHS “to go back and try again.”177  Others 
question whether Chief Justice Roberts would have found a memo that 
addresses reliance interests and says they do not outweigh the policy interests 
in rescinding DACA to also be “procedurally defective.”178  If this is so—if 
any explanation offered by DHS would fail to satisfy the Court—it would 
support Garland’s view that NHTSA could have only changed the Court’s 
ultimate conclusion in State Farm by adopting a substantively different 
policy.179 
In sum, nearly forty years after State Farm, judges, litigators, and law 
students continue to debate whether State Farm’s hard look review is 
procedural or substantive.  The same is true for the question of how a 
reviewing court should consider political influence in agency decision-
making when faced with a § 706(2)(A) challenge.180 
As the next part explains, Chief Justice Roberts’s decisions in Department 
of Commerce and Regents suggest clarifications of these two issues in State 
Farm.  Specifically, Part III argues Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review 
(1) provides that an agency will survive arbitrary and capricious review when 
its decision, even if motivated by politics, was the product of reasoned 
decision-making; and (2) serves as a procedural tool to ensure that agencies 
adequately discuss and justify their actions, rather than a substantive analysis. 
III.  HOW DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND REGENTS CLARIFY STATE FARM 
State Farm has long been criticized for presenting a muddled standard that 
lower courts struggle to apply and for politicizing judicial review.181  
Because the Supreme Court has failed to provide a precise definition of what 
constitutes reasoned decision-making, some argue that State Farm invites 
judges to vary their scrutiny of an agency’s explanation according to their 
political attitudes and ideologies, making judicial review unpredictable and 
riddled with disagreement.182  For example, Gillian Metzger maintains that 
the majority in Department of Commerce, when invoking State Farm, 
“dial[ed] down [its] scrutiny” of the secretary’s decision-making, whereas 
the dissent “dial[ed] it up.”183  Others maintain that State Farm’s hard look 
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review is a significant cause of ossification of administrative policymaking 
and recommend relaxing or eliminating the standard altogether.184 
Despite these alleged weaknesses, State Farm’s hard look review is 
recognized as an essential tool for legitimatizing agency actions because it 
serves as a significant counterbalance to Congress’s broad delegations of 
power to agencies.185  It cannot be overstated—and Department of 
Commerce and Regents adequately show—that decisions made by agencies 
can have profound consequences.  Had the secretary of commerce 
successfully added the citizenship question to the 2020 Census, the predicted 
lower response rate would have “affect[ed] how hundreds of billions of 
dollars in federal spending [were] distributed.”186  Similarly, had DHS 
lawfully rescinded DACA, 700,000 young adults would have lost their 
protection from deportation.187 
Because people may organize their lives around such policy decisions, 
administrative law principles like the reasoned decision-making requirement 
and State Farm’s hard look review are intended to protect the public from 
unreasonable, irrational, poorly justified, and narrowly considered policy 
changes.188  Expecting courts to adequately apply a muddled doctrine to 
decisions of such great significance is like playing Russian roulette:  the 
method is irrational, the injury can be catastrophic, and the outcome is 
inherently unpredictable.189  This part explores how Department of 
Commerce and Regents have clarified State Farm’s hard look review so that 
its future application will be more reasonable and obvious and less arbitrary 
and capricious. 
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A.  Justice Rehnquist v. Justice White—Who Won? 
Review of Chief Justice Roberts’s Department of Commerce opinion 
evidences a close alignment with Justice Rehnquist in State Farm.  First, both 
Justices explicitly acknowledge the role a president’s political agenda plays 
in agency policymaking.  Just as Justice Rehnquist stated that “a change in 
administration . . . is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s 
reappraisal of” its regulations,190 so too did Chief Justice Roberts insist that 
“a court may not set aside an agency’s policymaking decision solely because 
it might have been . . . prompted by an Administration’s priorities.”191 
Second, while both Justices show a commitment to enforcing the reasoned 
decision-making requirement, their as-applied interpretation of what 
constitutes reasoned decision-making appears more relaxed than that of 
others on the Court.  Indeed, NHTSA’s explanation for rescinding Modified 
Standard 208 as to the passive seat belt requirement adequately satisfied 
Justice Rehnquist, even though he determined it was “by no means a 
model.”192  Justice White, however, felt NHTSA “failed to articulate a basis 
for not requiring nondetachable belts.”193  Similarly, because the Census 
Bureau failed to present definitive evidence showing how responsiveness 
would be impacted, Secretary Ross’s inclusion of the citizenship question 
despite concerns of resulting inaccuracies convinced Chief Justice Roberts 
that the secretary adequately explained himself, even if the decision was not 
“the best one possible.”194  The same explanation, however, failed to 
persuade Justice Breyer that Secretary Ross engaged in reasoned decision-
making.195 
Metzger argues that in reaching the conclusion that Secretary Ross’s action 
was not arbitrary and capricious, Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed the 
importance of judicial deference to the “choices of an agency’s political 
leaders.”196  This argument is similar to Justice Kagan’s interpretation of 
Justice Rehnquist’s State Farm dissent as exhibiting a relaxation in the 
demand for NHTSA’s expertise, due to an acknowledgment that President 
Reagan’s election to office influenced NHTSA’s decision-making.197  
Metzger’s position would be persuasive if Chief Justice Roberts’s opinions 
only echoed Justice Rehnquist’s political deference in State Farm.  A close 
reading of Chief Justice Roberts in Regents, however, also reveals traces of 
Justice White’s emphasis on reasoned decision-making. 
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First, Chief Justice Roberts recognized the error in Secretary Duke’s 
decision-making process as the same error Justice White identified in 
NHTSA’s reasoning.198  NHTSA’s determination that, given the prevalence 
of automatic seat belts, Modified Standard 208 would provide minimal safety 
benefits did “not cast doubt” on the life-saving efficacy of airbags.199  
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts held the Fifth Circuit’s determination that 
DAPA’s benefits component was unlawful did not cast doubt on the legality 
of DACA’s forbearance component.200  This analogy became central to Chief 
Justice Roberts’s conclusion that DACA’s rescission without the secretary’s 
consideration of a forbearance-only program was arbitrary and capricious:  
just as the Supreme Court in 1983 held NHTSA could not completely 
abandon the passive-restraint regulation without explaining why an airbags-
only requirement was an insufficient alternative,201 so too, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued, the Court could not permit DHS to rescind DACA in full 
without consideration of a forbearance-only program.202 
Second, echoing Justice White’s finding that NHTSA failed to “bring its 
expertise to bear on the question,”203 Chief Justice Roberts found it 
problematic that Secretary Duke relied on the attorney general’s conclusion 
as to the illegality of DACA’s conferment of benefits to rescind the entire 
program—without explaining the rescission as to forbearance.204  
Recognizing that Congress delegated authority for establishing national 
immigration policy to the DHS secretary alone and that a forbearance-only 
option was within the secretary’s discretion, Chief Justice Roberts concluded 
that failure to consider this important aspect of DACA’s rescission meant 
that Secretary Duke failed to do her job.205  That is, DACA’s rescission 
required Secretary Duke to bring DHS’s expertise to bear on the issue, but 
implementing the attorney general’s advice without a complete explanation 
failed to satisfy State Farm and flouted Congress’s delegation to DHS.206 
Finally, just like Justice White in State Farm,207 Chief Justice Roberts did 
not consider whether and to what extent political influence played a role in 
Secretary Duke’s decision, beyond mentioning DACA’s genesis in the 
Obama administration and its attack under the Trump administration.208  At 
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most, both Justices identified the respective changes in administration, but 
that was all the explicit airtime given to politics. 
Finding that Department of Commerce resonates more with Justice 
Rehnquist and Regents with Justice White seems to thicken the age-old State 
Farm smog:  that the standard is unpredictable and invites judges to vary 
their scrutiny of an agency’s explanation depending on whether they approve 
of the agency’s policy choice.209  This position, however, overlooks key 
factual differences between Secretary Ross’s action in Department of 
Commerce and Secretary Duke’s in Regents, which logically lead to opposite 
outcomes when reviewing pursuant to State Farm. 
Even when Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a role for political influence in 
agency decision-making in Department of Commerce,210 his finding that 
Secretary Ross’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious exclusively turned 
on the explanation the secretary provided for including the citizenship 
question on the Census.211  Whatever “unstated reasons” Secretary Ross may 
have had for changing the Census were beyond Chief Justice Roberts’s 
review—even if it is safe to assume that satisfying President Trump’s 
political agenda constituted one of those reasons.212  What mattered to the 
Chief Justice was that the secretary considered alternatives to the citizenship 
question, discussed the costs and benefits of each, and explained that, in light 
of the Census Bureau’s uncertainty as to how the citizenship question would 
affect the response rate, the benefits of having more complete data from 
surveying the entire population outweighed the potential cost of decreased 
responsiveness.213  In other words, Secretary Ross did not “entirely fail[] to 
consider an important aspect of the problem.”214 
Conversely, when Chief Justice Roberts made no mention of political 
influence in Regents—aside for the implications that come with a change in 
administration—his finding that Secretary Duke’s decision was arbitrary and 
capricious depended solely on the lack of explanation provided for rescinding 
all of DACA.215  Indeed, the Chief Justice did not even consider, for example, 
whether President Trump’s agenda motivated the decision to rescind DACA, 
although there is little popular doubt that it did.216  All that mattered was that 
Secretary Duke “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem.”217 
The commonality, then, is clear:  Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review 
is only concerned with the sufficiency of the agency’s proffered explanation 
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of its action, looking to see that the agency has done its job in considering 
important aspects of the problem before it.  As for an agency’s “unstated 
reasons” for acting—such as political influences, motivations, and agendas—
these are excluded from the Court’s analysis.218  Thus, Chief Justice 
Roberts’s answer to the question of how much political influence is too much 
under State Farm is that this is the wrong question for courts to be asking.  
The only inquiry for a court engaging in arbitrary and capricious review 
pursuant to State Farm is whether the agency considered important aspects 
of the problem and explained its choice among competing alternatives. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s rejection of Secretary Ross’s decision to include 
the citizenship question on pretext grounds further supports this conception 
of State Farm.219  Chief Justice Roberts concluded that Secretary Ross’s 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious before he began the inquiry into 
whether it was pretextual.220  Thus, unlike Professor Metzger’s 
suggestion,221 the pretext analysis is separate from the Court’s review under 
State Farm.  This separation supports the conclusion that hard look review 
only scrutinizes the sufficiency of the agency’s explanation for its decision 
and is unconcerned with its political motivations.222  Secretary Ross stated 
that the goal in adding the citizenship question to the Census was to 
ultimately better enforce the VRA.223  Chief Justice Roberts, however, only 
analyzed this VRA enforcement rationale when engaging in the pretext 
analysis and excluded it from the Court’s application of State Farm.224  Chief 
Justice Roberts’s State Farm analysis may seem to have left out one of the 
secretary’s “stated reasons,” but this is not the case. 
Secretary Ross hoped to improve VRA enforcement225—this was his 
motive for engaging in the policy change.  But, Chief Justice Roberts showed 
that State Farm is unconcerned with motive.226  The focus of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s arbitrary and capricious review in Department of Commerce was 
the secretary’s justification for choosing the citizenship question as his 
course of action.227  Chief Justice Roberts confined his application of State 
Farm to scrutiny of the secretary’s conclusion that including the citizenship 
question would accomplish the stated goal of VRA enforcement, but Roberts 
did not discuss whether enhanced VRA enforcement was a wise policy 
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objective.228  In doing so, the Chief Justice affirmed that State Farm aims to 
ensure that an agency’s final action “was the product of reasoned 
decisionmaking” and that its policy decision to pursue a particular course of 
action is justified in light of alternatives and supported by evidence.229  
Scrutiny of the agency’s motivation for its policy change is simply beyond 
the Court’s analysis. 
The fact that the Court’s prohibition on pretext is absent from its arbitrary 
and capricious review does not then mean that the Court read a “sincerity 
requirement” into § 706 of the APA.230  Rather, the prohibition on pretext is 
baked into administrative law as a principal holding of Chenery II—that a 
reviewing court must judge the propriety of an agency’s “action solely by the 
grounds invoked by the agency.”231  Finding that the proffered motivation to 
improve VRA enforcement was “contrived,”232 the Court could not fulfill its 
Chenery II duty because the genuine “grounds invoked by the agency” 
remained undisclosed by Secretary Ross.233 
So, whom did Chief Justice Roberts select as the winner?  This question is 
not entirely appropriate because it assumes that Justices White and Rehnquist 
stood in stark opposition to each other in State Farm.  In reality, the two 
Justices agreed on much, and Chief Justice Roberts echoes both.234 
What can be said with more certainty, however, is that Chief Justice 
Roberts put to rest the widely held reading of State Farm as a “triumph of 
expertise to the exclusion of politics.”235  Rather, Department of Commerce 
and Regents affirm that political influence is permissible in agency decision-
making, because a court will ignore an agency’s political motivations for its 
action—whether stated or unstated—when engaging in arbitrary and 
capricious review.236  These decisions also suggest that “expertise” 
inappropriately describes the kind of explanation needed to survive arbitrary 
and capricious review because it implies a very high bar for agencies to meet.  
The Court, however, does not require the agency to prove it adopted the best 
course of action among alternatives or that it considered every possible 
alternative.237  Instead, as applied by Chief Justice Roberts, State Farm 
requires a showing that the agency’s action was the product of reasoned 
decision-making—that the agency considered alternatives, weighed the pros 
and cons of each, and explained why the selected course of action was 
chosen.  To hold, then, that an agency survived arbitrary and capricious 
review under State Farm is to affirm that, irrespective of the role politics may 
have played in the agency’s decision-making, the agency showed its work. 
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As argued, Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review comprises 0 percent 
politics, regardless of the role politics played in the agency’s decision-
making process.  The next section shows that 100 percent of Chief Justice 
Roberts’s hard look review involves the sufficiency of the reasoning process 
and not the agency’s substantive policy decision. 
B.  Get with the Process 
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm in Department of 
Commerce and Regents firmly supports the prevailing position that hard look 
review exclusively scrutinizes an agency’s reason-giving process.238  As 
discussed above, the contradictory outcomes in these two cases turned on key 
factual differences between Secretary Ross’s proffered explanation in 
Department of Commerce and Secretary Duke’s in Regents.239  Secretary 
Ross acknowledged major drawbacks of reinstating the citizenship question, 
discussed the costs and benefits of alternative policies, and explained why—
despite the drawbacks and in comparison to alternatives—the citizenship 
question still proved to be a reasonable course of action.240  In contrast, 
Secretary Duke deferred to the attorney general’s recommendation to rescind 
DACA in its entirety without considering whether an alternative, 
forbearance-only program would solve DACA’s potential illegality while 
preserving the reliance interests of its beneficiaries.241  Secretary Duke’s 
reasoning process outlined in her memorandum failed to convince the Court 
that DHS had considered all important aspects of the issue.242 
Although Garland argues it would be incorrect to read State Farm as 
identifying no wholly substantive component to hard look review,243 this 
argument is less persuasive when applied to Department of Commerce and 
Regents.  Garland supports his position by gleaning from Justice White’s 
opinion that NHTSA could not have proffered an explanation supporting full 
rescission of Modified Standard 208 that would have satisfied the Court.244  
This argument is inherently speculative because another explanation for 
NHTSA’s rescission of Modified Standard 208 never came before the Court.  
Garland, however, is not alone in reading State Farm as failing to clarify 
whether NHTSA would have been permitted to reach the same result on 
remand if it had provided a different explanation.245 
Notably, this lack of clarity in State Farm is absent from Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinions in Department of Commerce and Regents.  Unlike 
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Justices White and Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly provided that 
the decisions Secretary Ross and Secretary Duke attempted to implement 
were substantively lawful as ultimate policy decisions and within their 
delegated authority to implement.246  Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts 
stated that Secretary Ross’s decision to reinstate the citizenship question was 
not “substantively invalid,”247 and he acknowledged both that the law 
broadly authorizes the secretary to structure the content of the Census and 
that the Census historically inquired into citizenship.248  Chief Justice 
Roberts similarly affirmed that Secretary Duke had the authority to rescind 
DACA249 and that the Court was only to address DHS’s compliance “with 
the procedural requirement that it provide a reasoned explanation for its 
action.”250  In sum, Chief Justice Roberts clarified that Secretary Ross’s and 
Secretary Duke’s actions were substantively permissible. 
But he did not stop there.  Chief Justice Roberts also drew a definitive line 
concerning the Court’s responsibilities when reviewing an arbitrary and 
capricious challenge, an issue that State Farm only quietly addressed.251  Per 
Chief Justice Roberts, the question of whether the agency’s action actually 
constitutes good policy is beyond the Court’s review.252  In Regents, Chief 
Justice Roberts wrote that the Court does not resolve whether DACA or its 
rescission are wise decisions, acknowledging that this determination is within 
the secretary’s discretion.253  Similarly, in Department of Commerce, Chief 
Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s role is not to ensure Secretary Ross 
made the best possible decision and that if the Court were to second-guess 
his decision, it would be impermissibly substituting its judgment for that of 
the secretary.254  Thus, a more defined role for courts applying State Farm 
emerges, one that promotes judicial restraint when reviewing agency actions. 
Next, consider that Chief Justice Roberts’s resolution in both Department 
of Commerce and Regents was to remand to the agency.255  Garland’s 
framing of the distinction between process and substance proves particularly 
useful here, supporting the conclusion that Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look 
review is not substantive.256  As Justice Alito put it, by remanding, the Court 
told the agency to “go back and try again.”257  According to Garland, implicit 
in this resolution is that the agency can cure whatever defect the Court 
identified and later adopt the same policy it initially intended.258  This, in 
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turn, supports the view that hard look review is procedural.  The issue with 
Garland’s position, however, is that a reviewing court that believes an agency 
can only cure its defect by adopting a different policy is also likely to resolve 
via remand.259  Although Garland suggests that a court in this situation may 
impose a particular outcome on the agency instead of remanding,260 State 
Farm prohibits such action because a court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency.261 
But, the argument that remand proves Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look 
review is procedural is much more persuasive when contextualizing the 
Court’s resolution with its acknowledgment that both Secretary Ross’s and 
Secretary Duke’s substantive policy decisions were within their authority to 
adopt.  In Department of Commerce, Chief Justice Roberts’s remand and 
emphasis on the substantive validity of reinstating the citizenship question 
implies that Secretary Ross would satisfy the Court on remand by offering a 
nonpretextual motivation for the change in policy.262  Similarly, the remand 
in Regents with Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that DHS had the authority 
to rescind DACA suggests, as Justice Kavanaugh acknowledged, that 
remanding would only delay DACA’s ultimate rescission because a fuller 
explanation would survive judicial review.263 
Thus, while remand insufficiently clarifies whether the Court was 
scrutinizing the agencies’ reasoning processes or their substantive policy 
decisions, Chief Justice Roberts explicitly removed the substantive validity 
of the agencies’ policies from his analysis, showing that the defects in the 
secretaries’ reasoning processes were curable on remand and that the Court’s 
review was procedural. 
The significant distinction drawn by Chief Justice Roberts in applying 
State Farm is between substance and process.  Whether to describe Chief 
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Justice Roberts’s review as procedural, as opposed to quasi-procedural, 
provides little value here because the Chief Justice did not engage in this 
analysis himself.  Garland is correct to note that State Farm does not establish 
a step-by-step process that agencies must follow to survive arbitrary and 
capricious review.264  Garland also identifies seemingly substantive 
components in hard look review because a court, in reviewing the sufficiency 
of an agency’s explanation for acting, must thoroughly engage with the 
agency’s reasoning process.265  This, however, does not make judicial review 
pursuant to State Farm any less procedural.  Chief Justice Roberts’s hard 
look review is procedural because of what it does not evaluate:  the wisdom 
of the agency’s ultimate policy decision. 
It is the agency, and not the reviewing court, that must engage in 
substantive decision-making.  The focus of judicial review pursuant to State 
Farm, then, is not the agency’s substantive decision, but the thought process 
that led to the agency’s substantive decision.266  By applying State Farm in 
a way that only scrutinizes the agency’s reasoning process, Chief Justice 
Roberts affirmed that the substance of an agency’s action is within the sole 
discretion of that agency, and the Court’s role remains limited. 
C.  Putting the Issues Together:  What Chief Justice Roberts’s Hard Look 
Review Stands For 
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm restrains the 
Court’s role in reviewing agency actions.  By excluding political influences 
from the Court’s analysis while permitting their presence in agency decision-
making, the Court avoids engaging with politics itself but does not hinder the 
political branch’s ability to do so.267  By fixing the scope of its review on the 
agency’s reasoning process and not its ultimate substantive policy decision, 
the Court recognizes the danger in and seeks to avoid enforcing its own value 
judgments instead of those of the agency.268 
Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm also holds agencies 
accountable for their actions by affirming a strong commitment to the 
reasoned decision-making requirement.  By explicitly endorsing a role for 
politics in agency decision-making,269 Chief Justice Roberts rejected the 
method for ensuring accountability that President Wilson envisioned—
requiring agencies to be apolitical and expert driven.270  But, just because 
agencies may consider political influences in their decision-making does not 
mean State Farm permits a reviewing court to do so as well.  Indeed, Chief 
Justice Roberts also rejected a different way to increase accountability in 
agency decision-making—by, as some have proposed,271 requiring a 
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reviewing court to show more deference to an agency when the president 
contributed to the agency’s policy.272 
In his application of State Farm, Chief Justice Roberts makes clear that the 
mechanism for agency accountability is neither exclusive reliance on 
apolitical expertise nor deference to the president’s agenda but the reasoned 
decision-making requirement, a token of the interest group model of the 
administrative state.273  By requiring agency decisions to be well reasoned 
and honestly justified in light of the many different interests the decision may 
affect, Chief Justice Roberts’s commitment to reasoned decision-making in 
his application of State Farm holds agencies accountable for their decisions, 
which may impact the lives of many.274 
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s application of State Farm, Justice 
Breyer proposed that courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious judicial 
review should consider “the nature and importance of the particular decision, 
the relevance and importance of missing information, and the inadequacies 
of a particular explanation in light of their importance.”275  This proposal 
seemingly invites judges who disagree with an agency’s substantive policy 
choice to deeply scrutinize it by stressing the importance of the agency’s 
decision and conversely, to lighten up the scrutiny by downplaying a 
decision’s importance when the policy aligns with the judge’s views.  Thus, 
Justice Breyer’s approach does little to solve one of the main criticisms of 
State Farm—that it invites judges to vary their scrutiny of an agency’s 
explanation according to their own political attitudes and ideologies.276  If 
implemented, this critique would grow more forceful, as agencies may feel 
that the outcome of an arbitrary and capricious challenge depends deeply on 
which judge is assigned to hear the case, making judicial review all the more 
unpredictable. 
Most importantly, however, Justice Breyer’s proposal does not reaffirm 
State Farm:  it casts State Farm anew.  The criticisms Chief Justice Roberts 
received about his opinion being “lawless” ring truer, in fact, for Justice 
Breyer’s opinion in Department of Commerce.277  Justice Breyer’s proposal 
does not accord with precedent because State Farm never placed judges at 
the center of arbitrary and capricious judicial review.  Rather, State Farm 
assigned judges a narrow role that prohibits them from replacing an agency’s 
judgment with their own.  State Farm empowered judges to evaluate the 
agency’s proffered explanation and reasoning process to determine whether 
the agency sufficiently justified and thought through its action in light of 
alternatives. 
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It is these aspects of State Farm that Chief Justice Roberts enunciated in 
Department of Commerce and Regents.  Perhaps muddled previously, Chief 
Justice Roberts makes clear now that the agency and its reasons for acting sit 
at the center of the Court’s review under State Farm.  The president, the 
president’s agenda, other political influences, and a judge’s beliefs as to what 
the best policy would be are excluded from a court’s review.  For Chief 
Justice Roberts to hold otherwise would really be “convoluting the law” or 
acting like a politician.278 
Predicting how the Supreme Court will approach future arbitrary and 
capricious challenges from a dataset of only two decisions is inherently 
speculative—even more so given that the Court’s makeup has changed since 
it decided Department of Commerce and Regents.279  Time will show 
whether lower court judges and other Justices on the Court adopt the Chief 
Justice’s hard look review. 
But, what can be said with some surety is that unlike Chevron deference 
and the intelligible principle doctrine—both of which have been under recent 
attack by the current Justices—Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review does 
not raise the same separation of powers concerns.280  Rather, as applied in 
Department of Commerce and Regents, Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look 
review ensures a proper balance of power among the three branches:  it 
restrains the judiciary to protect the executive branch’s decision-making 
authority but also maintains the judiciary’s significant function of review to 
ensure the executive branch faithfully executes Congress’s laws.281  As such, 
it is not only possible, but perhaps likely, that the Chief Justice and his hard 
look review will continue to garner support from his colleagues on the bench 
when the Court is faced with future arbitrary and capricious challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
State Farm has long been criticized as providing limited guidance to 
judges and advocates on what is actually required for an agency to survive 
an arbitrary and capricious challenge.  Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look 
review settles two of State Farm’s previously unresolved questions. 
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As displayed in Department of Commerce and Regents, an agency’s 
decision will survive arbitrary and capricious review when, even if motivated 
by politics, it was the product of reasoned decision-making.  In other words, 
Chief Justice Roberts’s hard look review requires a reviewing court to be 
entirely unconcerned with political influence in agency decision-making, 
regardless of the role politics actually played in the agency’s process.  
Department of Commerce and Regents also show that hard look review is a 
procedural tool to ensure agencies adequately discuss and justify their 
actions, rather than a substantive analysis.  It is the sufficiency of the 
reasoning process and not the agency’s substantive policy decision that is the 
linchpin of the Court’s review.  In settling these two issues from State Farm, 
Chief Justice Roberts both restrains the judiciary’s role in reviewing agency 
actions and holds agencies accountable for their decisions, which impact the 
lives of many, by affirming a strong commitment to the reasoned decision-
making requirement. 
